I
n August 1980, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski sent President Carter a memo on how to use his stewardship of US foreign policy to his advantage in the final stages of his campaign against Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. In summarizing the themes of the presidency, Brzezinski wrote that "in time it will become clear that [the Carter administration offered] the proper course for the nation at this time: a building presidency, not a flamboyant, 'fire-fighting' one." 1 It was a far cry from Brzezinski's ambitious early advice, which spoke of initiating "a new phase in U.S. foreign policy." A unique constellation of factors, foreign and domestic, had come together to undermine the Carter administration's global agenda.
Carter's role in the Camp David peace process led him to navigate the space between politician and diplomat like no other president. The unique domestic features of the Arab-Israeli conflict, acting in tandem with regional dynamics, ensured that Carter's unprecedented presidential attempts for peace became mired in domestic politics. By the end of Carter's term, the reflexive influence of domestic politics and his ArabIsraeli policy had become so prevalent that it was nearly impossible to determine in which direction the influence flowed. Rather, it had simply become clear that each side served to reinforce the other. Domestic politics inevitably influence the foreign policy of any democratic polity. Yet the existing historiography has mostly elided the perils attendant to Carter's style of presidential diplomacy. Carter's involvement as the chief US diplomat in the Arab-Israeli conflict ensured that the presidency itself became the locus of domestic opposition stemming both from the substance of his proposals and the style with which he set them forth. Carter's personal role in the negotiations helped compel Egypt and Israel toward an agreement, but created its own complications. His diplomatic immersion activated domestic forces deeply invested in the dispute and set a precedent whereby regional parties require presidential attention for deals to be concluded.
The unique feature of Carter's presidency lay in how dramatically and intensively he involved himself in diplomatic minutiae. He never had to turn to his foreign policy specialists and ask, "'Would you explain to me the history of this particular issue,' or 'Will you show me on the map where the lines run or where is this town located,' because I knew it. And I could negotiate for hours with the subordinates of Begin and Sadat," Carter said later. "I knew personally what the issues were because I felt like that was a presidential responsibility."
2 As a result of this presidential prioritization, Carter became intimately identified with American policy toward the peace process. That activated a number of reinforcing domestic factors, some general to American foreign policy and others specific to US Arab-Israeli policy, that served to constrain what Carter could ultimately achieve.
From the outset, the Carter administration appeared insufficiently prepared for the intense emotions that animated the Arab-Israeli issue for many domestic actors, particularly the organized American Jewish community. Despite periodically flirting in 1977-78 with a public "confrontation" or "showdown" with Israel, especially over its settlements policy, the administration ultimately refrained from taking such a course. Regardless of whether a "confrontation" strategy would have provoked a change in Israeli behavior more toward Carter's liking, the administration's fear of adverse domestic response played the pivotal role in its decision not to pursue such a "showdown."
The characteristics that helped propel Carter to the presidency fed many of his problems in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. In 1976, American voters wanted a president who spoke his mind without having to craft his words carefully. They wanted a leader who seemed to be above politicswho did what was right for its own sake. But faced with a range of economic and international problems, after four years, Carter's "freshness and innocence" lost its appeal, in the words of Carter's energy secretary, James Schlesinger.
3 As Carter's term progressed, his freshness began to resemble na ï vet é , and his innocence and candor shifted from asset to liability.
Three broad characteristics of Carter's political style exerted powerful influences on his diplomacy. First, Carter learned through rough experience that speaking publicly-indeed, with too much candor and openness-on the Middle East could have severe domestic repercussions. His early comments on the contours of a settlement, though generally consistent with existing American policy, alarmed many of Israel's US supporters, who feared the new president applied pressure unevenly on Israel. Moreover, Carter's open style heightened the distrust of elite opinion, which was already uneasy about the self-described outsider president.
